Script
Journal Article
Slide Change
The Cold War may lead to huge changes in the international system but how about its consequences to the European continent. The paper Back to The Future: Instability In Europe After the Cold War, published in in 1990 argues how
- With the Cold War’s end, Withdrawal of the Soviet Union, United States, and their nuclear weapons, Europe won’t have a stabilizing authority anymore
- It study the history of Europe as always have been multipolar up until the cold war and how the new bipolarity has caused the longest peace Europe has ever felt.
- Finally as the paper was published before the official end of the Cold War, it will end with what the United States should do to keep Europe stable.
-
Ever since the Cold War started there has been no major crises and only 2 minor conflicts in Europe
Slide Change
- Contrast that to the first half of the 1900s, there were two world wars and numerous crises and minor wars which resulted in 50 million European deaths
- During the 17th and 18th century there was always at least one war in Europe
- The 19th century witnessed the Nepoleonic War, Crimean War, and the Italian and German wars of unification.
- Then the 1914-45 World Wars
- All these major conflicts seemed to end in Europe when the Cold War started, this period of peace in Europe is called the ‘Long Peace’
Slide Change
-
But how did the Cold War cause the Long Peace?
- It seems that multipolarity distribution of power system was the causes of most European wars
- The Cold War brought
- the bipolar system of distribution of power to Europe
- it made the military power between the two major powers, the US and USSR roughly equal
- it also brought with it nuclear weapons which acted as deterrence from war in Europe that can be destructive for any party involved
- It can be said that hyper-nationalism were the cause of pre-1945 wars in Europe and it was peaceful when hyper-nationalism subsided in the Long Peace
- First, Hyper-nationalism is in some parts caused by European states competition in the first place
- There is history of how hyper-nationalism in Europe had lead to wars, But its the structure of the international system that plays a bigger role
-
But before we analyze Europe’s future we must discuss the nature of the international systems through Realism
Slide Change
- Anarchy as you all know forces states to try and guarantee their own survival because there is no higher authority such as a global government to do so for them.
- Anarchy also leaves little room for trust between states because if you get betrayed, the consequence is severe
- Therefore, states try to maximize their relative power to other states to defense themselves
- States only go to war when the benefits outweigh the costs, and there are two factors in finding out the incentive of war
- the distribution of power between states is one, which helps show which states are capable of aggression and who are capable of stopping the aggressor
- and second the military weapons available to them: if they have offensive advantageous weapons they are more willing to attack if they have defensively advantageous weapons they deter enemies from attacking. If states possess weapons of mass destruction its a big deterrence from starting wars altogether.
Slide Change
-
Now lets look closer at the comparison between Bipolarity and Multipolarity
- In a bipolar system, smaller states are forced to choose between one of the two superpowers and cannot stand by.
- While a multipolar system allows smaller states to be far more flexible in their actions, either choosing one of the three or more great powers to support, or even stay neutral.
- In a bipolar system smaller states won’t attack each other and there is only one possible pairing of conflict, between the two superpowers
- While in multipolarity, both smaller states and great power can get caught up in minor or major wars and there are far more combination of conflicts possible than just one in the bipolar system.
- In a multipolar system, power imbalances between the great powers are common which can lead to instability
Slide Change
- To deal with that coaltitions can be formed to re-balance power. Although coalitions are more formed to stop an aggressor and not deter it, it still have 2 major inefficiencies.
- Geographically: when there is large distances or buffer states between enemies its hard to put pressure on the aggressor state
- As far as coordination goes:
- it requires collective decision making and collective actions leading to buck-passing: shifting burdens to allies
- it might be the case that smaller state improve its power position by waiting for the two warring sides to weaken each other
- states may not involve in re-balancing efforts thinking its not targeted by the aggressor
- the aggressor may also succeed in the window of opportunity while the coalition is still being built
Slide Change
- This re-balancing issue is not a problem in biopolarity
- Any influential coalitions are not possible as there are only two major powers, therefore balancing is done through internal methods instead by building military capabilities. Which is much more efficient than building a coalition.
- Lastly mulitpolarity is full of miscalculations as there are many major powers to keep track of, miscalculations happen frequently by pushing an enemy too far into war or underestimating enemies.
- This once again is not a problem for bipolarity. As there is only one opponent, its easier to learn their limits and predict their response.
- In a bipolar system, smaller states are forced to choose between one of the two superpowers and cannot stand by.
Slide Change
- When there is a balance of equality of military power between the major powers it is peaceful. This applies both to bipolarity and multipolarity.
-
However, great power inequalities is more prevalent in multipolarity.
-
Typically there is two major competing power that are far more powerful than the rest of the great powers.
-
Most wars in multipolarity comes from conflicts between the leading power who apires to be a hegemon going against the other great powers
Slide Change
-
All these wars cases are because of aspiring hegemons in conflict with other great powers
Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV, Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany,and Nazi German
-
-
Therefore, if the gap between the 1st and the 2nd strongest power is smaller it lowers the risk of war. So we want a second leading great power to balance out the first.
-
The cause of long peace: correlation between three theories (bipolarity theory, equality theory and nuclear theory). The three theories predict about both the pre-war and postwar eras.
Before the Cold War: Multi-Polarity System
Multi-polarity even occurred before both world wars. Diplomacy before World War I involved intense interactions among five major powers (Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany), and two minor powers (Serbia, and Belgium). Before World War II five major powers (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy) and seven minor powers (Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Finland) interacted. These relations produced some thirteen important conflicts. This multiplicity of conflicts made the outbreak of war. Many of the state interests at issue in each of these conflicts were interconnected, raising the risk that any single conflict that turned violent would trigger a general war, as happened in both 1914 and 1939.
Before World War II Germany was able to gang up with others against some minor states, and to bully others into joining with it. In 1939 Germany bolstered its power by ganging up with Poland and Hungary to partition Czechoslovakia, and then ganged up with the Soviet Union against Poland. In 1938 Germany bullied the Czechs into surrendering the Sudetenland, and also bullied the Austrians into complete surrender. By these successes Germany expanded its power, leaving it far stronger than its immediate neighbors, and thereby making deterrence much harder.
German power could have been countered before both world wars had the other European powers balanced efficiently against Germany. If so, Germany might have been deterred, and war prevented on both occasions. However, the other powers twice failed to do so. Before 1914 the scope of this failure was less pronounced; France and Russia balanced forcefully against Germany, while only Britain failed to commit firmly against Germany before war began. Moreover, Britain and the United States failed to recognize that they were threatened by Germany until late in the game-1939 for Britain, 1940 for the United States-and they therefore failed to take an early stand. When they finally recognized the danger posed by Germany and resolved to respond, they lacked appropriate military forces.
Multi-polarity also created conditions that permitted serious miscalculation before both world wars, which encouraged German aggression on both occasions.
In sum, the events leading up to the world wars amply illustrate the risks that arise in a multipolar world. Deterrence was undermined in both cases by phenomena that are more common under a multipolar rather than a bipolar distribution of power.
Finally, the events leading up to both world wars also illustrate the risks that arise in a world of pure conventional deterrence in which weapons of mass destruction are absent. World War I broke out partly because all of the important states believed that the costs of war would be small, and that successful offense was feasible. Before World War II these beliefs were less widespread, but had the same effect. The lesser powers thought war would be costly and conquest difficult, but the leaders of the strongest state -Germany-saw the prospect of cheap victory, and this belief was enough to destroy deterrence and produce war. Had nuclear weapons existed, these beliefs would have been undercut, removing a key condition that permitted both wars.
The Cold War Record: Bipolarity System
The European state system abruptly shifted from multipolar to bipolar after 1945. Three factors were responsible: the near complete destruction of German power, the growth of Soviet power, and the permanent American commitment to the European Continent.
Bipolarity supplies part of the reason. Bipolarity made Europe a simpler place in which only one point of friction-the East-West conflict-had to be managed to avoid war. The two blocs encompassed most of Europe, leaving few unprotected weak states for the Soviets to conquer. As a result, the Soviets have had few targets to bully. They have also been unable to gang up on the few states that are unprotected, because their West-bloc adversary has been their only potential ganging-up partner.
Bipolarity also left less room for miscalculation of both resolve and capability. The absence of serious crises during 1963-90 was due in part to the growth of such agreements on the rights of both sides, and the rules of conduct. These could develop in large part because the system was bipolar in character. Bipolarity meant that the same two states remained adversaries for a long period, giving them time to learn how to manage their conflict without war.
Bipolarity also left less room to miscalculate the relative strength of the opposing coalitions. The composition of possible war coalitions has been clear because only two blocs have existed, each led by an overwhelmingly dominant power that could discipline its members. Either side could have miscalculated its relative military strength, but bipolarity removed ambiguity about relative strength of adversarial coalitions arising from diplomatic uncertainties.
Nuclear weapons also played a key role in preventing war in post-World War II Europe. Nuclear weapons also imposed an equality and clarity on the power relations between the superpowers. This equality and clarity represented a marked change from the earlier non-nuclear world, in which sharp power inequalities and miscalculations of relative power were common.
In part this reflects the greater stability of the postwar order, arising from bipolarity, military equality, and nuclear weapons; with less expectation of war, neither superpower has faced the need to mobilize its population for war. It also reflects a second effect of nuclear weapons: they have reduced the importance of mass armies for preserving sovereignty, thus diminishing the importance of maintaining a hyper-nationalized pool of manpower.
Global Event Analysis: China’s Rise
China’s Debt Trap
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is far more than the cooperative economic strategy that China makes it out to be. China has been setting out what is called a Debt trap on financially vulnerable countries to gain geo-political benefits in return. So what China does is it lends out money in offers to build infrastructures such as ports and roads in countries that are unlikely to be able to pay back. These unreliable countries are ones that are in conflicts, authoritarian, and countries full of corruption. On top of that, China also requires that these foreign infrastructure projects that it funds must use Chinese construction companies, so its basically putting much of the money back into China’s economy rather than the host country’s economy. Therefore, these countries that China invest in many times are unable to pay back the loans and must lease away the ports, lands, or infrastructure back to China who made it for them. This was the case for Pakistan and Sri Lanka who had to lease their ports back to China for 50 years and 99 years respectively.
Slide Change
These are signs that China is trying to establish what is called ‘the String of Pears’ to set up navel bases along important maritime trade routes along the Indian Ocean and East Asia’s waters.
Slide Change
This can be explained in the context of the Structural Realism theory through Offensive Realism. Offensive Realism says that the anarchic system pushes a rising power to always seek more or be punished. It will do what it has to to gain more power no matter ethics or method. It mentions that having overwhelming power and dominating others is the best way to secure its own survival and security. This would explain how China’s economy has been rapidly growing but it will move to seeking geopolitical control over not just its neighboring area but also the greater Asia’s region. Assuming China will continue to rise, the United States is and will be its main challenger. Offensive Realism says an existing regional hegemon, in this case the United States in the west, will not let a rising regional hegemon come into being, referring to China in the East. They would rather have the uncontrolled region of East Asia divided and competed for among the regional great powers. This can explain the various US’s initiatives to be more involved in Asia’s economy and as a way to contain China’s influence. These includes the ‘pivot to Asia’ during the Obama administration, the Trade War by Trump and maintained by the Biden administration.
How structural realism interpreted Chinese economy is being militarized and mobilized to balance against US power?
China’s unprecedented economic growth has been coupled with the “world’s largest military build-up” via a huge expansion of military spending and technological advancement. This would superficially adhere to Realist interpretations of a China that wants to “change the international system” and “obtain global hegemony”. Statistics compiled by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) confirm China’s dramatic increase in military expenditure; during the period 2003–2012, its military expenditure increased by 175 per cent, significantly more than any other state listed in SIPRI’s Yearbook. In monetary terms, SIPRI states that China’s annual defence spending rose from over 170 billion in 2010.
Furthermore, estimates published by The Economist in 2012 show that, if recent trends continue, China’s military spending could overtake America’s after 2035. In addition, China’s military expansion has led it to be more confident in its military capacities and more assertive in their use. Realist interpretations are reinforced by the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law. Furthermore, Jia Xiudong’s comment in response to Taiwanese independence—“We will use whatever means we have to prevent it happening”—shows China’s military capabilities go “well beyond Taiwan”, helping to strengthen realist interpretations of China’s rise. A Pentagon senior defence official’s opinion that “the balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainland’s favour” supports this.
Nevertheless, solely Realist interpretations of China’s rise through a military perspective would constitute an oversimplification and exaggeration of reality. As SIPRI figures show in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, China’s (2 per cent) military expenditure is less than half that of the United States (4.4 per cent) and lower than that of the UK (2.5 per cent), Russia (4.4 per cent), France (2.3 per cent), India (2.5 per cent), and Saudi Arabia (8.9 per cent). Thus, “As a percentage of GDP, Chinese military expenditures do not appear to have reached levels where one could conclude that the Chinese economy is being militarised and mobilised to balance against US power.”
In addition, data listing military spending as a percentage of the world share shows China’s 5.5% representing spending of 89.8bn. While China’s increased military assertiveness has been highlighted, it is also important to note its diverse role in the international community.
For example, China’s troop deployment for UN Peacekeeping Operations has seen a twenty-fold increase since 2000, and in 2012, China’s troop contributions to peacekeeping operations outnumbered those of all permanent members of the UN Security Council. While there may be vested interests at stake for China, the level of cooperation and integration exhibited by its increasing role in UN peacekeeping missions—which seek global peace and security—suggests states are not only ‘self-interested’, as Realist theory would advocate. Hence, to use only Realist interpretations of China’s rise provides too narrow a view, as it does not explain the full extent of China’s rise through military aspirations.