Historical Development of Studies of Deterrence

1940s-1960s: After development of Nuclear Weapons, scholars say it could negate Clausewitz’s classic conception of war as a continuation of politics by other means
1949: during the Cold War when Soviet Union detonated their first nuclear weapon, concept of dterrence gained new urgency
1950 (Golden Age of Deterrence):
- Bernard William Kaufmann, Henry Kissinger, and Bernard Brodie developed a general approach that nuclear deterence requires credibility of threats likely to destroy a nation
- Assumes Rational Choice Theory and Deductive
- It stresses
  1. Importance of defining commitments
  2. Communicating the comittments to adversaries
  3. Developing capability to defend them and giving crediblity to the commitments
1960s: Thomas Schelling analyed deterrence as a bargaining tactic based on tacit signals
- Credibility became a problem when deterrence was between two nuclear states: national suicide is not viable decision making
“Thomas Schelling (1966) went so far as to suggest that it was rational for a leader to develop a reputation for being irratinal so his threats might be believed.” "Richard Nixon indicates that he took this advice to heart in his dealings with both the Soviet Union and North Vietnam (Kimball 1998: 76-86)" p.394
- If you lie and get caught, you lose credibility. If you lie and deterred others successfully, you maintain credibility.

References