Research

Shifts in Multilateralism

  • How would the US be too big for multilateral negotiation regimes?

  • During the Bush admin, the US was so big it used unilateral actions to expand its influence

    • through unilateral solutions rather than mutlilateral frameworks in pursuing US’s interest
  • Is mutilateral negotiation regimes becoming obsolete because US won’t use them anymore?

  • What are the consequences of US only using unilateral approaches?

  • Obama administration changed and recognized the consequences of dismantling the multilateral order (unilateral actions)

    • Collateral damage of one-sided actions can be bad for national interests in the long run
    • a Structural Realism strategic perception: what is the specific concept its referring to?
  • we live in a world of increasing mutual dependency, with a natural tendency in the direction of regime-building in order to reach more predictable negotiation results

    • if negotiation processes are embeded in strong and stable international structure, it will make gauranteed outcomes possible.

Coping With Challenges

  • New international orders come into being after man-made disasters
  • Regimes are created after major threats arises but only under strict conditions
    • But only if the threatened can’t deal with it on its own and need allies
      • If a strong state is threatened, a regime would hamper its capabilities
    • Also only if Ad-Hoc coalitions can’t be used and institutionalized structure is needed
  • New challenges can revive existing organizations that wasn’t used or lost its usefulness
    • Need for peacekeeping in Africa revived The Organization of African Unity, now African Union
    • The need for security, stability, protection of human rights and the emergence of new democratic systems revived the CSCE into the OSCE
  • Dilemma of new institutions
    • it creates a bargaining platform, but at the same time it restricts the bargaining range and freedom of the more powerful states
      • Powerful states would rather not be in an institution and form unilateral, bilateral, or trilateral arrangements instead
      • Sometimes states need institutions, but sometimes they choose not to
        • That can be disasterous for the common good of everyone in the institution

Possible Future Development

  • Evolution of regimes could be observed through the increasing cost of violence and the increase of international organization and cooperation
  • In the 21st century
    • a equilibrium or peace maintaining instrument is needed for a regime to mature and flourish
      • similar to the past of Mutually assured destruction, risk management, Concert of Europe, or a balance of interest
    • and this can take the first half of the 21st century
    • regimes can only strengthen if states also prioritize less-structured modes of cooperation such as
      • ad-hoc negotiation processes

      • bilateral bargaining because multilateralism doesn’t work without bilateralism

        “As negotiations are the life-blood of regimes, so bilateral negotiation is the gist and juice in creating a new balance of power among the major regimes, whether they are states or international organizations”

  • Level of negotiation is another problem
    • Some governments in the European Union push their national problems to the EU to handle and blame them for not being effective
  • Inclusiveness is also important as inclusiveness can bring both opportunities but also problems and exclusions even more so.

Conclusion

Main takeaways

  • bargaining with boundaries is a viable alternative to warfare and other tools of conflict management,
  • However boundaries could pose problems to effective cooperation that we have to undo. These problems are
    • Geographic boundaries
    • Systemic exclusion
    • Unwillingness to negotiate
    • Regulations obstructing creativity
    • Time Management
  • Regimes build networks to deal with negative aspects of boundaries
  • Context and processes affect and shape each other in the long run.