GIGW-C4: Resource Curse and Corruption

Class: IS402 Created Time: October 27, 2021 2:19 PM Database: Class Notes Database Last Edited Time: March 20, 2022 10:55 PM Type: Presentation Notes

  • Resource curse: the failure of state to use its own resources to improve its own country.

Historical Rise of Governance

  • Resource curse comes from problems of governance
  • Oil rich countries before 1990s were put through Western Imperialism
    • Africa
    • Oil companies shift blame of exploitation to politicians
  • Corruption focused analysis
    • Corruption can’t be seen through actions of actors
    • must be seen through global level as well as domestic
  • There are flaws in measuring corruptions
  • Before 1990s: Western Imperialism of Africa
    • Poverty, hunger, political instability
  • 1990s: focus on environmental change and corruption
  • Government should be at fault for not solving societal problems from revenues of oil/resource rich countries.

The Queue

  • What is the queue?
  • How the queue can describe why mineral-dependent countries tend to be more corrupt than others:
    • Disturb in physical queue (economic shock or terrorist attack):
    • Push in at the front (loss of trust in order)
      • people lose trust in the system
    • They’re trying to divert those resources for their own good.

How resource divide a nation?

  • Agricolia : the north and the south share similar benefit.
  • Petroland : the north and the south compete to earn more benefit resulting is social fragile at all level.
  • Polarization and social fragmentation are affected by conflict over mineral money.
  • Diversion can occur by religious, ethnicity, political faction, and horizontal division
  • Oil dependence and oil-based political conflict can lead to the fragmentation of a nation.

Petroland as the queue

  • Agricolia represent the diverse network of production and better subsequent collaboration.
  • Petroland represents what people are queuing or competing for.
  • The “misuse” and “private gain” are the core behavior in corruption.

VI. Cross-Border Corruption

  • Corruption is a global problem

    • Financial institutions even in global level

    💡 Corruption Perception Index: Switzerland is the least corrupt country, but it wasn’t accurate

  • Elf system-Gabon and nearby countries slush funding French political parties and intelligent services

  • Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI)

    • country-to-country approach
  • Investigating role of tax and tax havens

  • Transparency international-going through significant organizational changes → more engaging in tax havens

Alternative Ways of thinking about Corruption

  • Elites abusing public goods to advance narrow interest:
  • widen inequality, increase poverty, and undermines the faith in government
  • people depend heavily on perceptions of what others do
  • Italy: people that pay tax are called a bit thick headed
  • tax compliance depends positively on individual’s perceptions of others compliance level

Policy

Approaches

  • systemic solution that counteracts the government allocation of money is democracy
  • deeply analyze the division in society, economic policy, and the distribution of resources:
    • who will benefits, how should policy be changed, or does financial liberalization work
  • Transparency: state that lack transparency undergo two process
    • the secret of government’s earning, funding source, and what they use it for
    • citizens will be outraged about corruption and protest
  • changing transparency relationship will help
    • citizens don’t use mobilization

Analysis

  • corruptions come from big and powerful countries
  • pattern of corruption: elite and the rich and politically powerful groups of people
    • makes corruption unavoidable
    • people are selfish and greedy
    • people are competitive
  • we want all of what we gain
  • honesty and trust should be build from individuals
    • A leader of a country must show transparency or corruption will prosper

Distributing oil revenues directly: an answer?

  • Distributing oil revenues directly, and equally, to all citizens in a producer country, then taxing them directly on their income.
    • systematic solution
  • The benefits of this policy are:
    • There is the welfare effect: direct transactions creates long term wealth and income
    • It transforms the nature of politics: economic competition instead of relying on political lobbying
  • Objection on this policy:
    • Giving citizens money, then taxing them, is inefficient and costly.
    • Citizens have direct incentives to spend wisely; politicians often have incentives to spend unwisely.
    • In an ideal world, a ‘queue’ might be a good way of distributing benefits from oil.

Q&A

  • How can Cambodia learn from the concept of resource curse?
    • Be careful about who we do bussiness or associate with
    • Not rely on one source of income such as natural resources
      • Don’t put all your eggs in one basket
    • To focus on the long term success and not just short term
      • Some resource rich countries become greedy and not manage their profits properly
  • Would these resource rich countries do any better if they didn’t have a colonial past?
    • Institutions and systems are left over and used after colonialism
    • without colonial power there would still be in-fighting
      • Ex: South Sudanese groups civil war for natural resources
      • Unwillingness to share resources and riches in domestic setting