PAI-C11: Second Thoughts on Theory and Policy (1989) §

Class: IS405 Created Time: October 25, 2021 11:41 AM Database: Evergreen Database Last Edited Time: October 25, 2021 7:53 PM Type: Literature Notes

1. Afterword §

1.1 Principal Themes of Power and Interdependence §

The use of force has become increasingly costly for major states due to 4 conditions:

• risks of nuclear escalation
• resistance by people in poor or weak countries
• uncertain and possibly negative effects on the achievement of economic goals
• domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of force

Our argument about constraints on the use of military force laid the basis for our analysis of the politics of economic interdependence. This analysis contained three principal themes, which we did not explicitly distinguish from one another:

1. A power-oriented analysis of the politics of interdependence, drawing on bargaining theory
2. An analysis of an ideal type that we called “complex interdependence” and of the impact of the processes that it encompassed;
3. An attempt to explain changes in international regimes—which we defined as “sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence”.

The three themes of Power and Interdependence are to some degree distinct. Interdependence can be analyzed politically without endorsing the concepts of complex interdependence or international regimes; and the concept of international regimes does not depend for its validity on accepting complex interdependence as a useful simplification of reality. Yet we sought to relate our themes to one another. In particular, we argued that the explanatory power of overall structure theories of regime change would be lower under conditions of complex interdependence than under realist conditions. Nevertheless, since our argument was to some extent “decomposable” into its parts, it should not be surprising that some parts of it fared better in the later scholarly discussion than others. (Complex Interdependence, Regime Change, and Realism)

1.2. The Research Program of Power and Interdependence: A Critique §

• In Power and Interdependence, we sought to integrate Realism and Liberalism by using a conception of interdependence that focused on bargaining.
  • We were cognizant of the realities of power but did not regard military force as the chief source of power, nor did we regard security and relative position as the overriding goals of states.
• Through out the entire book, Complex interdependence remained a relatively underdeveloped and undervalued concept.

Interdependence and Bargaining §

• The major contribution of Power and Interdependence to the study of interdependence and bargaining was to stress that
  • any analysis of the politics of interdependence requires a sophisticated conception of bargaining
  • and that patterns of economic interdependence have implications for power and vice versa.
• We did not successfully develop a theory of linkage, which would indeed have furthered our understanding of world politics.
  • Instead, we simply moved the Structural Realism research program a little further toward taking into account relationships between political-economic interaction and patterns of military-political conflict.

Complex Interdependence §

The concept of complex interdependence is clearly liberal and has features opposite of Realism

• Complex interdependence is not accurate and can’t predict future of contemporary world politics.
  • But we used it as thought experiment of what the opposite of Realism’s assumptions were.
• A methodological problem of: complex interdependence is defined by goals and instruments of state policy
  • But arguments that: goals and instruments of state policy is affected by complex interdependence is saying the same thing twice
• There are two dependent variables in propositions about political processes:
  • changes in agendas
  • changes in the roles of international organizations. International Institution

Our failure to theorize about the domestic politics of interest formation had particularly serious effects on our analysis of the politics of complex interdependence as defined in terms of the goals and instruments available to governments. Understanding changes in complex interdependence must necessarily involve understanding changes in priorities among state objectives, which could only be achieved through an analysis of relationships between patterns of domestic and international politics. Furthermore, the characteristic of “multiple channels of contact” means that states are not unitary actors—that is, the sharp boundary between what is “domestic” and what is “systemic” breaks down. It is not difficult to see how our acceptance for research purposes of the system-unit distinction weakened the prospects for a deeper analysis of complex interdependence.

International Regime Change §

Our understanding of international regimes remains basic and limited. We do not have well-tested empirical generalizations, much less convincing explanatory theories of this process. Nor are we likely to have such theories of change without better incorporation of domestic politics into our models. The nature of international regimes can be expected to affect domestic structures and vice versa.

We know too little about the effects of international regimes on state behavior.

Structural theory remains useful for its simplifications, but should not be equated with systemic theory. Systemic theory is indebted to microeconomics which needs close investigation of domestic politics, to understand how states’ preferences change.

Regimes can be understood within an analytical framework that stresses self-interest: states may conform to the rules and norms of regimes in order to protect their reputations.

But neither these works nor other works on regimes have established to what extent, and under what conditions, the impacts of regimes on state interests are significant enough to make much difference in world politics. The fact that governments conform to most regimes most of the time suggests that regimes do indeed perform a coordinating function—but it tells us little about their efficacy in altering incentives through effects on governments’ reputations or in other ways.

In studying changes in international regimes, structural theory remains useful: its very simplifications highlight how self-interest can be consistent with the formation and maintenance of international institutions. But structural theory should not be equated with systemic theory, since systems incorporate not only power structures but political processes, including regularized patterns of practice which we refer to as institutions. Both structural theory and the broader process-oriented version of systemic theory that we sought to develop in Power and Interdependence are therefore inadequate by themselves. What researchers must now do is to link a process-oriented version of systemic theory closely with an analysis of domestic politics without suffering the loss of theoretical coherence that advocates of systemic theory have always feared.

1.3. Limitations of Structural Theory: Systemic Political Processes §

We argued that systems have two dimensions: structure and process. We used the term “structure” in the neorealist sense to refer principally to the distribution of capabilities among units “Process” refers to patterns of interaction—the ways in which the units relate to each other.

The processes that take place in a system are affected by its structure and by the characteristics of the most important units in the system. However, the limitations of structural theory lie in the way that even if we understand both state preferences and system structure, we will often be unable to account adequately for state behavior unless we understand other attributes of the system, such as the character of international and transnational interactions and the nature of international institutions.

Examining these systemic processes leads the investigator to look more carefully at the interactions between system and unit characteristics, focusing on systemic processes directs our attention to the reciprocal connections between domestic politics and international structure—and the transmission belts between them.

Factors such as the intensity of international interdependence or the degree of institutionalization of international rules do not vary from one state to another on the basis of their internal characteristics. Additionally, making the unit level the dumping ground for all unexplained variance is an impediment to the development of theory.

These nonstructural systemic factors affecting state strategies can be placed into two general categories: (1) nonstructural incentives for state behavior, and (2) the ability of states to communicate and cooperate. Nonstructural incentives present opportunities and alter calculations of national interest by affecting expected ratios between benefit and costs or risks, without affecting the distribution of power among actors. The ability to communicate and cooperate can provide opportunities for the redefinition of interests and for the pursuit of strategies that would not be feasible if the only information available to states were about other states’ preferences and available power resources.

The book emphasis on process as well as (rather than instead of) structure moves us toward a synthesis of, rather than a radical disjunction between, realism and liberalism. Neorealism is appropriate at the structural level of systemic theory; liberalism is most fruitful at the process level. We aspire to combine them into a system-level theory that incorporates process as well as structure. This approach toward a synthesis of neorealist and liberal theories, however, it does raise a danger of tautological reasoning.

1.4. Perceptions and Learning §

State choices reflect elites’ perceptions of interests, which may change in several ways. National interest may also change through learning.

Learning is marked by a shift from overly simple generalizations to “complex, integrated understandings grounded in realistic attention to detail.” Ernst B. Haas, who has been the leader in advocating the importance of learning for theories of international relations, sees learning occurring internationally when states “become aware of their enmeshment in a situation of strategic interdependence.” When learning occurs, “new knowledge is used to redefine the content of the national interest. Awareness of newly understood causes of unwanted effects usually results in the adoption of different, and more effective, means to attain one’s ends.”

International regimes probably play a significant role in incremental learning because in such settings they can:

1. change standard operating procedures for national bureaucracies;
2. present new coalition opportunities for subnational actors and improved access for third parties;
3. change the attitudes of participants through contacts within institutions;
4. provide information about compliance with rules, which facilitates learning about others’ behavior;
5. help to delink one issue from others, thus facilitating learning within specialized groups of negotiators.

Some learning is incremental and continuous. Incremental learning occurs when bureaucracies or elites come to believe that certain approaches work better than others for their purposes. Some learning, by contrast, results from large discontinuous events or crises such as Munich, the Great Depression, or the invasion of Afghanistan.

Whether learning is incremental or discontinuous, therefore, regimes may play a role by creating, altering, or reinforcing institutional memories.

5. Conclusion §

The research program suggested by Power and Interdependence was overall a fruitful one despite its failures and successes. The program has stimulated useful further research.

There is a widespread (although not universal) view among scholars that structural realism, or neorealism narrowly interpreted, is inadequate as an explanatory framework for contemporary world politics.

We need to concentrate now on the interplay between the constraints and opportunities of the international system, including both its structure and its process, and the perceptions of interests held by influential actors within states. We need to examine how conceptions of self-interest change, as a result of evolving international institutions, individual or group learning, or domestic political change. This effort will require dynamic analysis, buttressed by detailed empirical research; and it will entail the further blurring of boundaries between the fields of international relations and comparative politics.

2. Two Cheers for Multilateralism §

Unfortunately, acceptance of this point does not advance U.S. foreign policy very far. For the key issue is not belated reliance on the regimes and institutions that exist, but future improvement of those regimes and institutions so that the national interests of participating states will be better served.

Strategic thinking means focusing on a key question that is rarely addressed in current policy debates: What patterns of international cooperation should the United States wish to establish in a fragmented, heterogeneous world?

Because foreign policy by nature involves responding flexibly to unexpected and contradictory events, it benefits little from detailed blueprints for action in the distant future. Yet without a strategic view, tactics cannot be placed in perspective: Flexible responses to contradictory events will run an administration around in circles. One element of a long-term strategy is contingency planning so that tactical opportunities can be seized. Long-range planning that bars innovative responses to new events becomes a destructive exercise, but a purely tactical approach that ignores the impact of policy choices on the structure and institutions of world politics may waste significant opportunities to alter the framework within which the United States can cooperate with other countries.

2.1. The Need for Regimes §

The U.N. system is only part of the complex set of rules and institutions that affects how states manage their interdependent relationships. International regimes—the rules and procedures that define the limits of acceptable behavior on various issues—extend far beyond the scope of the United Nations. Regimes often include formal organizations, but are not limited to them. Regimes are institutions in a broader sense: recognized patterns of practice that define the rules of the game.

In short, regimes facilitate the cooperative pursuit of governments’ objectives. They do not substitute abstract, common interests for national interests. Small states often welcome international regimes as barriers to arbitrary abuse of power by the strong. But regimes can be equally valuable to great powers, such as the United States, that want to create, but are unable to dictate, the terms of a stable world environment.

Not all regimes, of course, contribute so effectively to the management of collective problems. Some regimes enjoy less consensus than others. But those that work well characteristically perform at least four valuable functions. First, regimes facilitate burden sharing. Second, regimes provide information to governments. Third, regimes help great powers keep multiple and varied interests from getting in each other’s diplomatic ways. Finally, international regimes introduce into U.S. foreign policy greater discipline, a quality most critics believe it needs in greater measure. In short, regimes usually are in America’s interest because the United States is the world’s foremost commercial and political power.

2.2. Unrealistic Visions §

Seven maxims or saying may help the United States develop an effective strategic approach to international regimes.

• Do Not Try to Recapture the Past: Nostalgia for a simpler, more neatly arranged world leads Americans periodically to propose “grand designs” to solve foreign-policy problems. But postwar visions are now unrealistic.
• Ask Whether the World Really Needs It: Regimes are needed only when uncoordinated behavior by governments has much worse results than coordinated action. Issues lacking serious conflicts of interest may need very little institutional structure.
• Build on Shared Interests: To flourish, regimes must enhance the goals of governments.
• Use Regimes to Insure against Catastrophe: Insurance regimes are less satisfactory than effective regimes that control events and thereby eliminate adversity rather than simply share its burdens. It is better, other things being equal, to prevent floods by building dams than merely to insure against them.
• The Best Enforcement Is Self-Enforcement: Viable regimes rely on the principle of long-term reciprocity. No one trusts habitual cheaters. Over time, governments develop reputations for compliance, not just to the letter of the law but to the spirit as well. These reputations constitute one of their most important assets.
• Look for the Right Moment: In the life cycles of international regimes, erosion takes place gradually, as governments and transnational actors find loopholes in the rules. Defenders of regimes spend their time putting their fingers in the dike. Occasionally, crises threaten to burst the dike and destroy the established order. In periods of crisis, opportunities for the construction of international regimes characteristically arise.
• Use Regimes to Focus U.S. Attention on the Future: In the eyes of its critics, American foreign policy is notoriously unreliable. The United States has always had difficulty keeping sight of its own long-term interests. Thus, attempting to lay out the principles of international regimes can clarify the country’s long-term, internationalist interests. This effort at long-range planning also helps the United States retain its alliance leadership. In addition, regimes often provide leaders of allied countries with opportunities to influence the domestic debates of alliance states by holding each to the regime’s standards.

2.3. Regime Maintenance §

Major international regimes continue to reflect U.S. interests, by and large because of U.S. influence in establishing and perpetuating them. But unless the United States takes the lead in maintaining them, it is unlikely that other countries will have the interest or ability to do their share. This U.S. interest in regime maintenance does not mean the United States need remain passive as others in pursuit of narrow national interests chip away at existing rules and arrangements.

In addition to maintaining existing regimes, Washington should be looking for chances to construct new regimes or to expand old ones when opportunities arise. Following are three areas where substantial progress may be possible in the future.

• United Nations Peacekeeping: Limited peacekeeping is worth reconsidering, not the overly ambitious efforts reflected in Korea and the Congo.
• International Debt: There is a good deal to be said for acting now, before memories of the crisis fade, to construct a sustainable set of arrangements that will ensure both a steady flow of resources to developing countries from private and public sources and regular payment of debts that have been incurred.
• Exchange Rates: Disillusionment with the current arrangements for floating exchange rates is widespread. The moment for concerted action on the exchange-rate regime may be arriving; thought should be devoted now to what the character of such a regime should be and to how concessions by the United States could be used strategically to attain U.S. objectives in other areas, such as trade.

Such a combination of institutional strategy and tactical flexibility could be simultaneously visionary and realistic. It would be opportunistic in the best sense: ready to seize opportunities provided by crises to make regimes more consistent with America’s interests and values. It is a viable alternative to recurring fantasies of global unilateralism.