Notes
Conclusion
The UNAMIR mission in Rwanda was a huge failure because the first operation was sent to monitor the ceasefire between the government and the RPF, but when the genocide started happening, they didn’t have the rights to do anything to stop it. Even UNAMIR II came after the genocide is already finished and the RPF won already.
External Analysis
Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, US and UK governments, supported extensive analysis of Rwanda failure and came to 5 conclusions:
- that the mission as deployed was insufficient in scale to deal with the potential challenges from opponents known to exist;
- that poor budgeting and procurement procedures further hobbled the effectiveness of the force as deployed;
- that inadequate planning for the contingency of opposition removed options from the UN at the moment of attack;
- that the secretary-general was at fault in terms of lack of leadership, for failing to try to generate an adequate response from the Security Council, when the genocide first got underway;
- and that irrespective of these points, the Security Council failed in its basic responsibilities, at a critical time to undertake a response to the outbreak of genocidal violence.
Internal Analysis
Initially, no studies pointed fingers, named names, or faulted member states directly, in fear of consequences. Kofi Annan soon after coming into office, opened research into the root cause of the failure of the two most disastrous missions of the UN peacekeeping
Kofi Annan (elected 1997)
- Launched studies on UNAMIR and UNPROFOR
- It specified responsibilities for failure of states, actors, and even himself
also came to the conclusion that the secretariat failed to inform the needs of the Rwanda mission to the UNSC
Failure
-
Unwillingness to act: Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali failed to act on information(cable) of the genocide
-
Narrow and Insufficient mandates and UNSC’s refusal to strengthen it
- UNAMIR didn’t have the ability to intervene and became a bystander to the genocide
⇒ Peacekeepers can only use force for defense and protecting foreigners, not intervene civilian killing
-
The withdrawal of peacekeeping troops when Rwandans needed them the most. The UNAMIR troops were withdrawn when 10 Belgian soldiers were killed
-
UNAMIR II deployed only in August, was after the genocide has stopped and the war is won
Lessons Learned
- Changed management of early warning information: any info of a potential insurgent or violence from the field is quickly passed upward for decision making rather than be ignored
- Limited improvements in financing and planning of peacekeeping missions: the UNSG now has the capability of allowing up to $50 million on new missions to make sure the mission gets all its necessities and a good start
- Influenced willingness of UNSG and member states to stand firm in the face of crisis: in the 1998 mission in Sierra Leone rather than withdrawing troops when attacked the UNSG demanded action from the UNSC, and with UK’s help they managed to retain peace.
Who in the UN conducted an Internal research into the failure of the Rwanda mission? In what year
a. Kofi Annan, 1994
b. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1996
c. Kofi Annan, 1997
d. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1995
What changed in the UN after the failure in Rwanda?
a. Increased credibility of the Secretary General
b. Changed the early warning information management system
c. The UN lost funding for peacekeeping operations
d. All the above
Rwanda
hutus 85%
tutsie minority
natives
farmers
share language
butus overthrow tutis
1980s tutis supported by Uganda and allies formed RPF
over throw butus president for their homeland rights
1992 peace aggreement signed
1993 Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was killed
⇒ causing Hutu to aggress against Tutsis (mass killing)
Both RPF and Uganda sent requests to UNSC
for military observers, make sure military supplies don’t cross the border
blue helmets evacuated foreigners but not Tutsis(target)
⇒ United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda
Tutsi won the government
the hutus soldiers went to prison after