Back to The Future: Instability In Europe After the Cold War §

• Main Idea: what are the consequences for Europe when
  • The Cold War Completely Ends
  • The Soviet Union Withdraw its troops
  • The United States stops its presence
  • Bipolarity switches to Multipolarity
• How would it affect the peace in Europe?
• Author’s Argument: if the cold war ends there will be increased major crises and wars in Eruope
  • Europe will be more prone to violence and conflicts
  • Supported by “the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace”
  • The absence of violence/war in Europe the past 45 years is due to
    1. The bipolar distribution of military power on the continent
    2. the rough military equality between the two major poles in Europe
    3. Each power was armed with large nuclear arsenals
  • Hyper-nationalism led to the two world war and the reduction of it in Europe since 1945 caused the postwar peace
  • Bipolar → 5 countries Multipolar
    • German, France, Britain, Italy, Soviet Union
    • More prone to instability (prone to conflicts, power inequalities)
  • The removal of nuclear arsenal from Europe would create power vacuum increasing risk of war
    • Counter arguments based on Liberalism:
      • Globalization caused interdependence
      • Democratic Peace Theory
      • European learned from experience how costly conventional and nuclear destruction can be, and won’t use them
  • What should the United States do after the Cold War’s end?
    • US should encourage process of limited nuclear proliferation in Europe
    • US shouldn’t withdraw fully from Europe
    • US should forestall the re-emergence of hypernationalism in Europe

Explaining the Long Peace During the Cold War §

• During the last 45 years there were no crises and only 2 minor conflicts in Europe
• Contrast to the first 45 years of the 1900s, there was two world wars and numerous crises and minor wars which resulted in 50 million European deaths
• Europe is not a peaceful place naturally
  • During the 17th and 18th century there was always at least one war in Europe
  • The 19th century witnessed the Nepoleonic War, Crimean War, and the Italian and German wars of unification.
  • Then the 1914-45 World Wars
  • Only to end with peace for such a long timer afterwards

Causes of the Long Peace §

• The multipolarity distribution of power caused instability in Europe that was the cause of most wars in European history
• What caused the Long Peace?
  • The bipolarity of distribution of power in Europe
  • The roughly equal military power between US and USSR
  • The apperance of nuclear weapons (encouraging deterrance)
• Domestic factor of Hyper-nationalism caused pre-1945 wars and the absence of it caused the Long Peace
  • Hyper-nationalism is also caused by European states competition
  • But the structure of the international system play bigger roles
• Anarchy
  • Leaves little room for trust between states because the high consequence if betrayed
  • States must guarantee their own survival because there is no higher authority than state to do so
• States maximize their relative power for defensive means
• Peace happens when the cost is higher than benefits of going to war
• We determine the incentive to go to war by two factors
  • the distribution of power between states: shows which states are capable of aggression and who can check their aggression.
  • the nature of military weapons available to them: nuclear weapons causes much more destruction which directly impact incentive to go to war in the first place

Bipolar vs Multipolar §

• In a bipolar system: smaller states are forced to choose a side between the two superpowers
  • minor powers won’t attack each other and there’s only one possible conflict (between the two superpowers)
  • Coalitions doesn’t happen, while balancing is done through building up military capabilities instead
  • Due to only one opponent its easier to learn their limits and predict their actions
• In a multipolar system: smaller states are more flexible in either choosing a great power or stay neutral
  • conflicts is more possible and can involve both smaller states and great powers
  • Deterance is more difficult because power imbalance is common leading to alliances conflicts or a great power coercion of a minor state.
  • Coalitions can form to re-balance power, but they only formed to stop aggression, not deter it.
    • They form inefficiently due to
      • Geography: hard to put pressure on aggressor state (buffer state)
      • Coordination:
        • requires collective decision making and collective actions leading to buck-passing: shifting burdens to allies
        • smaller state improve its power position by waiting for the two warring sides to weaken each other
        • states may not involve in re-balancing efforts thinking its not targeted by the aggressor
        • the aggressor may succeed in the window of opportunity while the coalition is still being built
  • Miscalculations are common by pushing an enemy too far when they’re willing to fight and these small mistakes can lead to war

Equality of Power §

• Equality between the poles = peace
• Most wars under multipolarity comes from conflict between a leading power aspiring to be a hegemon going against the other great powers
  • Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV, Revolutionaryand Napoleonic France, WilhelmineGermany,and Nazi German
    • Put into slides, don’t say them
  • If the gap between the 1st and 2nd strongest great power is smaller it lowers the risk of war

The cause of long peace: correlation between three theories (bipolarity theory, equality theory and nuclear theory). The three theories predict about both the pre-war and postwar eras.

Before the Cold War: Multi-Polarity System §

Multi-polarity even occurred before both world wars. Diplomacy before World War I involved intense interactions among five major powers (Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany), and two minor powers (Serbia, and Belgium). Before World War II five major powers (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy) and seven minor powers (Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Finland) interacted. These relations produced some thirteen important conflicts. This multiplicity of conflicts made the outbreak of war. Many of the state interests at issue in each of these conflicts were interconnected, raising the risk that any single conflict that turned violent would trigger a general war, as happened in both 1914 and 1939.

Before World War II Germany was able to gang up with others against some minor states, and to bully others into joining with it. In 1939 Germany bolstered its power by ganging up with Poland and Hungary to partition Czechoslovakia, and then ganged up with the Soviet Union against Poland. In 1938 Germany bullied the Czechs into surrendering the Sudetenland, and also bullied the Austrians into complete surrender. By these successes Germany expanded its power, leaving it far stronger than its immediate neighbors, and thereby making deterrence much harder.

German power could have been countered before both world wars had the other European powers balanced efficiently against Germany. If so, Germany might have been deterred, and war prevented on both occasions. However, the other powers twice failed to do so. Before 1914 the scope of this failure was less pronounced; France and Russia balanced forcefully against Germany, while only Britain failed to commit firmly against Germany before war began. Moreover, Britain and the United States failed to recognize that they were threatened by Germany until late in the game-1939 for Britain, 1940 for the United States-and they therefore failed to take an early stand. When they finally recognized the danger posed by Germany and resolved to respond, they lacked appropriate military forces.

Multi-polarity also created conditions that permitted serious miscalculation before both world wars, which encouraged German aggression on both occasions.

In sum, the events leading up to the world wars amply illustrate the risks that arise in a multipolar world. Deterrence was undermined in both cases by phenomena that are more common under a multipolar rather than a bipolar distribution of power.

Finally, the events leading up to both world wars also illustrate the risks that arise in a world of pure conventional deterrence in which weapons of mass destruction are absent. World War I broke out partly because all of the important states believed that the costs of war would be small, and that successful offense was feasible. Before World War II these beliefs were less widespread, but had the same effect. The lesser powers thought war would be costly and conquest difficult, but the leaders of the strongest state -Germany-saw the prospect of cheap victory, and this belief was enough to destroy deterrence and produce war. Had nuclear weapons existed, these beliefs would have been undercut, removing a key condition that permitted both wars.

The Cold War Record: Bipolarity System §

The European state system abruptly shifted from multipolar to bipolar after 1945. Three factors were responsible: the near complete destruction of German power, the growth of Soviet power, and the permanent American commitment to the European Continent.

Bipolarity supplies part of the reason. Bipolarity made Europe a simpler place in which only one point of friction-the East-West conflict-had to be managed to avoid war. The two blocs encompassed most of Europe, leaving few unprotected weak states for the Soviets to conquer. As a result, the Soviets have had few targets to bully. They have also been unable to gang up on the few states that are unprotected, because their West-bloc adversary has been their only potential ganging-up partner.

Bipolarity also left less room for miscalculation of both resolve and capability.  The absence of serious crises during 1963-90 was due in part to the growth of such agreements on the rights of both sides, and the rules of conduct. These could develop in large part because the system was bipolar in character. Bipolarity meant that the same two states remained adversaries for a long period, giving them time to learn how to manage their conflict without war.

Bipolarity also left less room to miscalculate the relative strength of the opposing coalitions. The composition of possible war coalitions has been clear because only two blocs have existed, each led by an overwhelmingly dominant power that could discipline its members. Either side could have miscalculated its relative military strength, but bipolarity removed ambiguity about relative strength of adversarial coalitions arising from diplomatic uncertainties.

Nuclear weapons also played a key role in preventing war in post-World War II Europe. Nuclear weapons also imposed an equality and clarity on the power relations between the superpowers. This equality and clarity represented a marked change from the earlier non-nuclear world, in which sharp power inequalities and miscalculations of relative power were common.

In part this reflects the greater stability of the postwar order, arising from bipolarity, military equality, and nuclear weapons; with less expectation of war, neither superpower has faced the need to mobilize its population for war. It also reflects a second effect of nuclear weapons: they have reduced the importance of mass armies for preserving sovereignty, thus diminishing the importance of maintaining a hyper-nationalized pool of manpower.

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